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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops the paper entitled ‘‘Time, the Value of Money and the Quantification of Value’ 
which was presented at the conference of the Middle East Technical University in September 1998. 
It presents the case for a value-theoretic treatment of liquidity preference in axiomatic form, based 
on a temporal analysis. 
It discusses why temporal analysis is universally excluded from economic discourse. It argues that 
economic thought is divided not by the schism between classical and marginal, but the chasm 
between time and equilibrium. This divide is found in more or less every branch and every period in 
the history of economic thought; the classical variant of equilibrium appeared as Say’s Law, while 
the Austrians tried to become the temporal variant of marginalism. It suggests that the ‘Weintraub-
Davidson-Eichner’ project is an attempt to identify what ‘temporalist’ approaches have in common. 
It argues there is a new element to this project, namely the growing body of evidence that Marx, 
too, was a temporalist, and that the temporal interpretation of Marx has more in common with Post-
Keynesianism than it has with the rest of Marxism.  
Keywords: Liquidity, Value, Quantification, MELT, MEL, Money, Labour, Marx, TSSI, 
Temporalism 
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WHAT HAPPENS IN RECESSIONS? A VALUE-THEORETIC APPROACH TO LIQUIDITY PREFERENCE 
Introduction 
The sharpest way to present the purpose of this paper is to restate a remark I made at the last 
conference: in my view, the temporal interpretation of Marx has more in common with Post-
Keynesianism than it has with the rest of Marxism. An encounter between Post-Keynesianism and 
the temporal approach to Marx can only benefit both. 
I argued elsewhere1 that economic thought is divided not by the schism between classical and 
marginal, but the chasm between time and equilibrium. This divide is found in more or less every 
branch and every period in the history of economic thought; the classical variant of equilibrium 
appeared as Say’s Law, while the Austrians tried to become the temporal variant of marginalism. If 
I have rightly understood what Balinky calls the ‘Weintraub-Davidson-Eichner’ project, it is an 
attempt to identify what ‘temporalist’ approaches have in common. I want to put the case that there 
is a new element to this project, namely the growing body of evidence that Marx, too, was a 
temporalist. 
Why do the good guys always lose? The equilibrium view generally dominates, because as Eichner 
notes, economics is not a science. It spontaneously  promotes an equilibrium variant of everything 
in it no matter how dissident or heterodox − whether this be ISLM Keynesianism, dualist Marxism, 
or Walrasian marginalism. This is because only the equilibrium paradigm provides a theoretical 
apparatus which guarantee conclusions to which its funders are amenable. A Gresham’s Law of 
theoretical selection operates to promote it. In particular, in any rigorous analysis, equilibrium turns 
out to be an indispensible support for the neoclassical ‘real-nominal’ distinction. 
The core of this paper is the argument that the real-nominal distinction is a disguised theory of 
value; it operationalises the idea that real assets are measured by the use-value, or ‘quantity of 
things’ which they contain. This concept, I argued last year,2 underlies both marginal and Sraffian 
general equilibrium; indeed the apparently rival concepts of utility and 'physical quantity' emerge on 
closer study as two different aspects of the same actually-existing thing − use-value. 
The balance of evidence in my opinion shows that this ‘use-value’ concept of value has been 
mistakenly attributed to Marx by most of economics. Not surprisingly, it does not exhibit the 
behaviour which a genuinely temporal approach reveals, such as a rate of profit which falls as 
accumulation proceeds. 
Two strongly disputed assertions have thus been discounted by the mainstream on the selfsame 
grounds. The Post-Keynesian insistence that money matters, and the Marxist insistence that 
accumulation begets a falling profit rate, are both discounted on the basis of two linked postulates: 
equilibrium, and the pre-pubescent notion that the size of a thing reveals its value. 
The time is propitious for a rigorous alternative foundation. It would be vain to imagine this could 
gain the affections of our funders, but it could provide a more solid bulwark against their prejudices. 
Since equilibrium provides a false foundation, we must ourselves ask  without prejudice ‘what can 
we assume that we know, if we deny equilibrium?’ This is the approach of this paper. 
I show that on extremely simple assumptions, we can demonstrate temporal phenomena with no 
counterpart in comparative statics. In particular, the notion of liquidity preference can be deduced 
from simple temporal identities; the quantity theory of money, and the notion that money is a veil, 
can also be refuted. Finally by connecting these dynamic equations to an evident relation between 
accumulation and the rate of profit, we can show that simple temporal explanations are available, 
                                                 
1
 Mr Marx and the Neoclassics; presented to the 1996 conference of the History of Economics 
Society, Vancouver 
2
 If they’re so rich, why ain’t they smart? Presented at the 1997 conference of the IWGVT 
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though inaccessible to any equilibrium account, for both the cyclical movement of the economy and 
its 'catastrophic' phase of a sudden sharp decline in asset prices followed by a relatively rapid fall in 
the pace of accumulation. 
Preamble 
I begin with two fundamental absences from General Equilibrium which all temporal thinkers 
acknowledge: time, and ignorance. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the connection 
between the two. We hope also thus to broach value in a way that other temporal thinkers will find 
congenial.  
I begin by noting that though ignorance is a fruit of time, time is not a joint product of ignorance. 
The future is unknown precisely because it is the future, and I know no economist who complains 
the past is unpredictable. Since the forces of ignorance stem from the darker forces of time, I shall 
in this paper confine myself to the latter. 
Rates of return under more than one money 
Suppose an asset K grows, for any reason. The money profit on it over any period is the change in 
its price: if we start with £10 and end up with £11, our profit is £1, the growth in the asset measured 
in money.  If the asset grows continuously at a rate K′, the money rate of return on this asset at any 
given time is 
 
K′
K  ,  (1) 
the ‘proportionate rate of change’ of K. This crops up so often that we will use a special notation for 
it: 
for any x, define  x+ = x′
x
  
Now suppose K can be priced in two different moneys, m and l. We use these like conventional 
money signs, so that just as $12 is 12 dollars, m14 is 14 units of m. Our asset measured in m is mK, 
and lK when measured in l. If the notation gets difficult, write $ instead of m and £ instead of l (for 
now). We can now write the return
 
on K when designated in money m as 
 
mK′
 mK  (2) 
or just mK+ (3) 
This depends on the money of account. If I hold an asset which is constant in dollars, and the dollar 
price of the pound falls, the asset will rise when measured in pounds. Only if the change rate is 
constant will the rates be the same.  
We will call the exchange rate of m for l (‘m per l’) ml; evidently lm = 1/ ml. 
Clearly mK = ml × lK (4) 
In words: the price in dollars is equal to the price in pounds times ‘dollars per pound’. The notation 
may seem idiosyncratic but it makes it easier to follow exchange relations: superscripts ‘cancel’ 
dimensionally with subscripts. 
What is the relation between the two rates? Suppose ml  fluctuates. Differentiate (4) using the 
product rule: 
 
mK′ = (ml × lK)′= ml × lK′ + ml ′ × lK (5) 
Divide through by capital stock mK, giving after a small amount of manipulation 
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mK+ = 
lK′
lK  + 
m
l ′
 m
l
  (6) 
 =  
lK+ + ml+ (7) 
In words: the dollar rate on any asset is equal to the pound rate on the same asset plus the 
proportional rate of change in the exchange rate. 
Theorem 1: Money is only a veil if all prices are constant 
The statement ‘money is a veil’ is equivalent to the following proposition: the behaviour of the 
economy cannot be affected by changing the money of account. 
Proof of the theorem: Suppose first that any price varies. Since any commodity may be used as 
money of account, by equation (7) the rate of return will differ if the varying commodity is used as 
money of account. But the rate of return on assets affects behaviour. Therefore, if the price of 
anything varies, the behaviour of the economy can be altered by using it as money of account.  
Speculative profits, liquidity preference, and the need for a concept of value 
The rate of return mK of any asset depends on the money of account m. Changes in price therefore 
offer a rational basis for holding an asset of constant size measured in itself − such as liquid money. 
Suppose for example the price of silver is rising: 
 
m
s
+ > 0 (9) 
Since any commodity including silver may be conceived as a money of account, the rate of return 
on an asset consisting of silver can be written 
 
mS+ = sS+ + ms+ (10) 
that is to say, the rate of return on silver, measured in money, is greater than the rate at which the 
silver grows when measured in itself. In fact, even a silver hoard which does  not grow at all will 
show a positive profit rate if its price is rising and the faster it rises, the greater the profit. This is 
valid for any asset and hence extends to any money as soon as it is used as means of payment. 
Two conclusions follow. First, the need arises to distinguish purely speculative profits, which result 
from changes in price, from ‘real’ profits, arising from something else, whatever that something 
may be. That is, the need arises to distinguish the real value of a thing from its nominal value. 
Though taken for granted in almost all of economics, it is far from clear what this distinction means. 
One purpose of this paper is to establish that it contains a dormant but inescapable concept of value. 
Second, equation (10) establishes a rational basis for liquidity preference, that is, for holding a 
money asset. This we will express as a theorem. 
Theorem 2: holding liquid money is a rational profit-maximising behaviour if prices are 
falling fast enough 
If we have an asset M which is itself money, equation (10) appears as 
 
mM+ = sM+ + ms+ (11) 
that is  sM+ = mM+ − ms+ (12) 
and since mM+ for liquid money is zero, this becomes 
 
sM+ = − ms+ (13) 
that is, the own-rate of money, measured in terms of some other commodity, is minus the rate at 
which the money price of this commodity is rising. Consequently if the price is falling, there will be 
a positive own-rate of money, measured in the other commodity. If moreover 
 m
s
+
 > sS
+
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then real wealth, in the form of a usable commodity, may be acquired faster by holding money and 
using it to buy this commodity, than by deploying the commodity itself to increase its own 
magnitude. There is no necessary upper limit on ms+ and, therefore, in a sufficiently deflationary 
atmosphere money will be preferable to every other asset.n 
The rationality of liquidity preference 
Liquidity preference in the literature often seems to me to be presented as a kind of psychologically 
deviant behaviour as if it contrasted with rational profit-maximising. But if in consequence of 
holding liquid money one may increase one’s ownership of usable things faster than by holding the 
things themselves then by any standard it is a rational, profit-maximising behaviour. Moreover as 
far as rational expectations are concerned, it does not seem to me reasonable to assert that if prices 
are falling, a rational agent might expect them to go on falling. So it seems to me that liquidity 
preference, far from being in conflict with the assumptions of mainstream economics, is a 
conclusion from these assumptions which arises when one examines prices that are changing. If any 
contradictions arise − and we shall try to show they do − then the fault lies, not with the idea of 
liquidity preference but with the ideas of mainstream economics. We think it is worth making this 
idea rigorous. 
There is a connection between this goal and the requirement of a rigorous value theory and in this 
sense I wholly concur with Randall Wray’s judgement that Keynes needs or ‘should have adopted’ 
a labour theory of value. The central idea that we have, is that in order to make the idea of liquidity 
preference rigorous, we must at the same time make the idea of value rigorous. We can then clarify 
that liquidity preference arises quite naturally when money rates of return exceed value rates of 
return, that is, when the monetary expression of value is rising. 
However, first we have to establish why this cannot be done on the basis of the neoclassical 
distinction between real and nominal. 
Origin of the real-nominal distinction in neoclassical economics 
We used the cumbersome term ‘proportionate rate of change’ instead of Keynes’ (1977:223)3 term 
‘own-rate’. We decided against this because the name suggests an intrinsic property of the asset; but 
as Keynes noted (1977:224) and as just established, if prices are changing then this rate depends on 
the unit of account. 
Nevertheless, if the asset consists of a single commodity4 then one particular own-rate is intuitively 
‘proper’ to it, namely, the increase of the asset measured in itself; thus if 10 corn becomes 15 corn 
in a year, its ‘corn-own-rate’ cC+ is 50%. To make this distinction clear, we will reserve the word 
‘own-rate’ for this purpose. We will use ‘rate of return’ for the more general case, qualifying where 
necessary as the ‘dollar rate’, the ‘pound rate’ or where appropriate the ‘corn rate’. 
The difference between own-rate and rate of return appears, at first sight, to lay the basis for an 
adequate distinction between speculative and real profits. It appears intuitively reasonable to define 
real growth as an increase in size, and nominal growth as an increase in the price of use-values 
independent of an increase in size. Most economics blithely proceeds as if this intuitive idea gives 
rise to no contradiction, which is quite unscholarly given the attention it has given to the 
                                                 
3
 “for every kind of capital-asset there must ber an analogue of the rate of interest on money. For 
there is a definite quantity of (e.g.) wheat to be delivered a year hence which has the same exchange 
value to-day as 100 quarters of wheat for ‘spot’ delivery. If the former quantity is 105 quarters, we 
may say that the wheat-rate of interest is 5 per cent per annum; and if it is 95 quarters, that it is 
minus 5 per cent per annum. Thus for everly durable commodity we have a rate of interest in terms 
of itself,” Keynes  (1977:222) 
4
 or, which is the same thing, a basket of constant proportions 
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contradictions in the alternative value-concept. To the extent that economics succeeds in both 
enterprises, as we shall show, it is because it has used equilibrium to abolish the contradictions of 
its own real-nominal distinction, and then foisted the results on Marx.. However, the price of this 
essentially ideological operation is a heavy one: it means that the resulting theory sacrifices all 
possibility of applying to the real world. 
Rate of return, rate of growth, rate of profit, and rate of investment. Moral and material depreciation 
We will later need to distinguish the rate of return from the rate of growth, which is the rate at 
which the asset actually accumulates due to investment. The difference between the two is thus the 
private income or consumption of the asset’s owner.5 Implicitly, this constitutes a definition of 
investment; investment is the increase in the value of an asset due to accumulation, measured in 
money. 
We want in passing to draw attention to a neglected point: the mass and rate of investment vary 
with the unit of account, and in a proportion that is different from the variation of the size of the 
asset. As an extreme example consider an asset S fixed in size but rising in its dollar price; sS' is 
zero but sS' is positive. Measured in dollars, the owner is investing. Consider also an asset S which 
is both physically accumulating and falling in price due to technical progress. In that case lS' will be 
less than sS' and we can separate the total lS' into two components, material and moral depreciation: 
Material depreciation = sS' 
Moral depreciation = lS' − sS' 
Internal contradictions of the real-nominal distinction 
Rates of return differ both from asset to asset and from money to money. There are hence two 
sources of variation; the intrinsic growth or own-rate of the asset as we have just defined it (a 
change in its size) and variations in its price. This distinction is the intuitive basis for the 
neoclassical distinction between real and nominal. 
Though intuitively reasonable, the distinction produces a contradiction from within itself, precisely 
because own-rates differ. If the corn-rate differs from the bean-rate, on what basis can we say that 
corn is more real? And if the dollar-rate on corn differs from the pound-rate on corn, on what basis 
can we say that the dollar is more nominal? We have not one, but a multiplicity of real-nominal 
distinctions and the idea cannot be made rigorous. The introduction of indexation does not abolish 
this problem, as the controversy around the Boskin commission clearly indicates; indeed, it further 
complicates it since now we are facing not just a vast range of single commodities but a even vaster 
range of baskets formed of them. 
Moreover any commodity may itself form the basis of a money of account, so that we may equally 
speak of the corn-rate on dollars, as the dollar rate on corn. In summary, if any relative price 
changes, this introduces both a range of so-called real rates, and a range of so-called nominal rates, 
of return. In a régime of varying prices − that is, in the real world − there is no such thing as a single 
‘real’ rate of return or a single ‘real’ measure of a commodity. 
One theoretical presupposition, and only one, abolishes this contradiction; if all prices are constant, 
and all assets have the same intrinsic return, then all own-rates will be the same. Then, and only 
                                                 
5
 My usage differs from Keynes in one further sense. Keynes defines own-rates in terms of the 
relation between spot and forward rates, the market’s ex ante anticipation of return. I confine myself 
to the actual growth of the asset as observed ex post. When we speak of the behaviour of agents, 
this frees us of the need to make any assumptions concerning psychology or expectations, except to 
presume that the past influences them in some way. The mechanisms of this influence may require a 
more or less subtle theory as the reader desires, but since my results are true regardless of the 
mechanism, I hope even the subtlest of readers will be compelled to accept them. 
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then, it becomes theoretically rigorous to speak of ‘the’ real rate of return in the economy. This 
circumstance is that of an economy in a state of either complete rest, or balanced proportionate 
growth (a ‘von Neumann ray’). This in turn presupposes no imbalance between supply and demand, 
which would produce a change in price. Outside of this supposition − the assumption of competitive 
general equilibrium − there is in fact no coherent basis for selecting any particular commodity’s 
use-value as the ‘invariant measure’ of size. 
Inflation and the Quantity Theory of Money 
If the world was actually in equilibrium, the real-nominal distinction could not exist. True, we can 
define a money of account for an equilibrium economy, and even deduce theorems on the 
supposition that prices in this nominal money vary over time. But if we allow this money to become 
an actual means of payment − and if it isn’t, neither inflation nor the quantity theory can apply to it 
− then as Townsend (1937) points out, these price variations would themselves become a source of 
additional demand through the mechanism of speculative profits, and so prices could not actually be 
what is predicted by the original supposition of equilibrium. From this we can derive the following 
two corollaries of theorem 2: 
Corollary 1: the quantity theory of money is false 
Proof: By Theorem 2, for any definition of the price level and for any structure of rates of return, 
there always exists a rate of variation in the price level such that money is preferred to all other 
assets. In this situation there will be no trade and so the quantity of money must be independent of 
the volume of trade.  
This extreme form of the proof may be rejected on the grounds that the quantity theory, like so 
many hand-waving theorems in economics, has a range of applicability. But the same method of 
proof shows that money will be held as soon as the rate of fall in the price level exceeds the profit 
on the asset with the lowest return, violating the quantity theory. Thus if there is a spread of returns, 
the impact of a falling price level will always be to divert a certain portion of money into hoards of 
liquid assets, and this portion will be the greater, the faster prices are falling. 
Corollary 2: the general equilibrium determination of prices is false 
Proof: since there is a motive to hold assets other than the demand requirements arising from the 
neoclassical demand schedule, actual effective demand will differ from that given by the demand 
schedule, being augmented by any speculative holding of assets. In particular if the money of 
payment is hoarded due to such dynamical effects, all prices will affected and no price can be 
specified solely from the demand and supply schedules. 
‘Real money’ 
Neither inflation, nor the Quantity Theory of Money, can be framed without a real-nominal 
distinction. Both contain a variable called ‘the price level’. A price level cannot exist, and has no 
meaning, except as a ratio between an actual price and some magnitude distinct from this actual 
price. 
The concept of value thus arises implicitly in every theory that makes a real-nominal distinction, 
even though this is not usually admitted. But if the actual money-price of a thing is distinguished 
from something which is common to all commodities and which behaves like a price, but is not the 
actual money price, then this distinct thing is an alternative measure of the commodity, that is, an 
estimate of its value. 
The notion that lies behind the idea of a ‘real’ economy underlying the nominal economy is the 
following: the real economy behaves as if goods were purchased and sold in this real money. All the 
principal quantities in the economy are talked about, in economics, as if this were true: thus 
economists speak of the real rate of return, of real output, of real wages, and so on. If these ideas 
corresponded to actual money transactions then nominal money would just be a sort of label 
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attached to them, and could make no difference to them. If, on the contrary, real transactions lacked 
any of the normal properties of money, then by virtue of the very fact that nominal money can be 
used to buy things, it would have to be preferred at some point. 
Among the most important of the properties of money is that it is additive, or linear. If one asset A 
costs £10 and another B costs £20, then the two sold together cost £30; in symbols 
 
£A + £B = £(A+B).  
Substantial theoretical problems arise if real prices do not behave like this. We can illustrate this in 
the following way. Suppose real prices are not additive and suppose that, for example  
 
rA + rB < r(A+B).  
In that case, I can increase my real wealth as follows: acquire some A for £A and some B for £B. 
Combine them, sell them together, and I have more money than I started with: which, of course, I 
can convert into additional real wealth. Nor can we escape this conundrum by looking at society as 
a whole, for we simply find that the total wealth of society is indeterminate; depending on whether 
we count its As and Bs together, or separately, we get a different measure of its wealth. Indeed, the 
real value of any aggregate of goods becomes a function of how it is divided up. 
If, therefore, the word ‘real’ is intended to represent something that actually influences behaviour 
and which agents attempt to increase − whether this be utility or physical quantity − then endless 
contradictions arise if it is not additive.6 
To investigate both where these contradictions lead, and what the alternative is, we specify a money 
of account, which we will call ‘real money’, as follows: divide the nominal price by the price level, 
however this is calculated. This is simply the money of account which is used, for example, in the 
National Income statistics when these are reported in constant, instead of current prices. In symbols 
let us use mr for the price level where m is nominal money. We can then define the ‘real price’ of K 
by the relation 
 rK = mK/ mr = rm × mK 
The question ‘is real wealth additive’ then reduces to the following: can r function as a money of 
account? 
what is a ‘temporal result’? 
The above, very short, preamble, establishes, in my opinion, some of the key results which are 
required of a temporal critique of equilibrium theory. I’d like to rehearse the method I tried to use 
because of the way it relates to the need for dialogue. 
I endeavoured to begin from a very simple supposition which could be endorsed by any temporalist 
and certainly by both Marx and Keynes7; that there may be more than one money of account, and 
that the relative valuation of goods in terms of different moneys of account may fluctuate in time. 
                                                 
6
 Like many devices in mainstream economics, the concept of macroeconomic real magnitude is in 
practice a disguised reversion to cardinal utility. If I double all the use-values in a basket of goods, 
a quantity index records that I have doubled the real measure of this basket, that is, it is presumed to 
provide twice as much usefulness. 
7
 “On the world market a double standard prevails, both gold and silver. Hence the absurdity of all 
legislation laying down that the banks of a country should form reserves only of the particular 
precious metal circulating in the country as money” Marx 1976:241. “It may be added that, just as 
there are differing commodity-rates of interest at any time, so also exchange dealers are familiar 
with the fact that the rate of interest is not even the same in terms of two different moneys, eg 
sterling and dollars.” Keynes 1977:224 
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To put it another way, fixed exchange rates are an unacceptable presupposition for a general or even 
realistic analysis. From this simple supposition I deduced a series of decisive critical objections to 
the normally-accepted dogma of neoclassical economics. These objections are also, incidentally, 
shared by Marx and Keynes. 
My point is the following: by adopting the minimum presuppositions, presuppositions comon to 
both schools, I have produced results that must hold in either school. Of course, this result may 
appear differently for each school, and moreover each school will add to the results aspects of 
explanation and theory that are its own particular insight. For example, I think most Post-
Keynesians would want to add in the question of ignorance. I think that Marx would have drawn 
back from ascribing causal or explanatory status to ignorance which he would hold (like myself) to 
be a consequence of other factors, such as the passage of time and above all, alienation.  
But it is not necessary to the above results to take a position on ignorance. Like Laplace when asked 
about God, I had no need of this hypothesis; I therefore remained agnostic on it, in order to produce 
results of the greatest possible generality. 
But by this same token, this criticism has a force, it seems to me, which is hard for mainstream 
theory to find an answer to. Indeed, logically it can only maintain the Quantity Theory, and the 
thesis that money is a veil, if it denies that any price can change over time. It is for this reason that I 
consider the thesis of equilibrium to be an implicit presupposition of neoclassical theory. Even if 
this thesis is not stated, none of its key results remain true unless this supposition is adopted. 
(section to be included on the necessity of a monetary value relation: the non-additivity of ‘real 
money’; the source of value is displaced into circulation. This leads to contradiction since, if value 
is created in circulation, there is no necessity for production. We could augment wealth without 
limit through trade. The definition of a consistent, additive value measure in which value is added 
only in production. The definition of production consistutes the separation of purposeful human 
activity from the mere fructiferousness of nature (increment of use-value); the measure of 
production is human activity. The ‘first equality’ as the mathematical formalisation of the 
requirement that value cannot be created in circulation. Necessity that the first equality should 
include money itself) 
(second section on circulation; it is a generally desired requirement of theory that it should explain 
distribution. But ‘what’ is distributed? Inadeuquacy of the use-value measure for assessment of 
distribution. Necessity of a divergence of value from price; if value does not diverge from price, the 
price mechanism does not alter its distibution and there is no source of economic movement. Value 
is a price, not the price; why it is a misconception to consider value theory as a means of predicting 
prices. Theorising transfers, unequal exchange; value as a money of account. As a money of 
account it has an intrinsic measure and since this measure is independent of its rate of exchange, it 
is given by its role in production) 
Value, profit rate, and catastrophe 
Profit rate fluctuations and the onset of crisis 
We are now in a position to frame the ‘solution’ to the question implicit in the title of this paper: 
what is it that happens in a crisis? To do so, however, we must prejudge a result from later on. I’ll 
do it this way round because it is sometimes helpful to know where things are leading, before 
setting out.  
From the point of view of the value-concept implicit in the ‘real-nominal’ distinction, there is no 
sensible reason for a crisis to happen. By ‘sensible’ I mean something that arises out of the 
equations governing accumulation in themselves, as an endogenous process. The reason is that 
technical progress, with a use-value measure of value, inevitably increases the profit rate. This is 
because technical progress continuously increases the ‘quantity of things’ in the economy; indeed, 
that is what technical progress consists of, largely.  
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If we regard the profit rate as a principal determinant of investment behaviour, then, technical 
progress as such should always be an incentive to increase both output and the rate of technical 
progress. Accumulation should continue upwards, ever upwards. Indeed, there is a certain one-
sidedness about the criticisms addressed to Marx’s theory of the tendency of the rate of profit to 
fall: he is criticised because, it is argued, the theory of the falling rate of profit predicts inevitable 
collapse; but this doesn’t happen. But the Okishio theorem equally predicts boundless 
accumulation, and that certainly doesn’t happen either. 
From a use-value standpoint, therefore, we require some external, exogenous reason for the onset of 
crisis: traditionally, either a profit squeeze, or a lack of entreprenurial spirit, or something else that 
is not produced by the accumulation process itself. It is true that these can be endogenised, as 
Goodwin very successfully does with the profit-squeeze; nevertheless, it means that in order for 
accumulation to produce cyclic behaviour, intermediation is required. 
One of the most important findings of the temporal interpretation of Marx is that it yields the 
following result: the profit rate is directly governed by the accumulation process. Take K, our asset, 
to be the whole sum of wealth in the economy on which the capitalists expect a return, that is, the 
total sum of productive goods, financial assets, commercial assets, and so on, advanced by private 
capitalists for the purpose of making a profit. If the rate at which profit is generated in the economy 
is S (being equal to the total rate at which labour works, less the value consumed by the workers) 
then the temporal view finds that the rate of return on this capital in terms of labour value is given 
without contradiction as Marx states, as 
 
S
 K  
However, K is itself growing as a consequence of accumulation, according to the normal Harodian 
relation: 
 K' = I 
where I is the rate of investment. Thus since S is governed by the size of the labour force, or at least 
has a maximum so governed, the accumulation process must lead to a fall in the return on capital 
overall, though this may be distributed unequally so that some capitals still maintain their return. In 
Keynes’s terms, the schedule for the marginal efficiency of capital will fall. 
However to express this result rigorously we have to define value; I want to show later that we can 
treat this as a ‘labour money of account’, being the labour value of K, expressed in a special money 
chosen such that £1 always represents 1 hour.8 
Of course, this labour money of account is not the directly visible rate of exchange; but it is not 
particularly difficult to advance dynamic mechanisms through which it will impinge on actual 
prices, and indeed, in my opinion this is the true subject matter of macrodyamics properly 
conceived. At this point it isn’t my intention to go very deeply into this, since all I want to do here 
is indicate the possibilities inherent in a temporal treatment. In particular, what I want to 
demonstrate is that the relation is almost certainly dynamic rather than static; hence, labour values 
impose themselves on observed prices on average and over the course of a cycle, but not at any 
given moment of time. On the contrary, the divergence of price from value is one of the principal 
motors of the macroeconomy and to seek, as many Marxists do, to establish an exact numerical 
                                                 
8
 This choice corresponds very closely to what Marx himself frequently states when he asserts that 
the value of money remains constant. This is often taken as a statement about the conditions 
governing the production of the money commodity; it is logically more sensible to read it as a 
straightforward simplification required so that accumulation can first be studied independent of 
monetary fluctuations, which Marx intended to bring in at a later stage in discussing the credit 
mechanism 
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relation at every moment in time, is in my view quite forlorn and contrary to what is needed to 
conduct any serious macrodynamic enquiry. 
Therefore, suppose for now that the rate of return in terms of labour money so defined, actually 
impacts real investment. In that case, we already have the germs of an account of the crisis, which I 
have presented in its simplest form in my second paper to this conference. As accumulation 
proceeds, the size of capital stock in labour-value terms will rise as a natural consequence of 
accumulation. But since the mass of profit is constrained from above by the size of the population 
and simple biology, the average return on capital will fall. At a certain point, this will choke off the 
demand for investment and indeed, if the process is cyclic − and my second paper sows this is a 
perfectly practical possibility − then at a certain point there will actually be disaccumulation in 
value terms. This may occur even though in physical terms, goods continue to accumulate, since as 
a consequence of technical progress the moral depreciation of these goods will result in a net loss of 
value (what marx terms the release of capital) 
But why should this produce the characteristically asymmetric, sawtoothed movement of the 
business cycle with its sudden crashes and slow recoveries? In the explanation for liquidity 
preference outlined above, we have the basis for a simple and rational explanation. 
The nominal profit rate mK+ can be expressed in terms of the labour value profit rate and the 
monetary expression of value: 
 
mK+ = lK+ + ml+ (14) 
Here lK+ is the value profit rate and ml  is the monetary expression of labour, so that ml+ is the rate at 
which this MEL changes. The nominal profit rate is thus related to the underlyin value rate by the 
addition of a dynamic magnitude which will raise the nominal rate when prices are rising relative to 
labour, and will decrease it when prices are falling relative to labour. 
But during the boom phase of the cycle, precisely what we may observe is a systematic rise in all 
pices, caused by the fact that investment demand is increasing as capital is drawn into the 
productive sectors by the high average profit rates. We would expect, therefore, that the observed 
profit rate would be exaggerated in the boom phase. 
If, however, the effect of the underlying decline in the value profit rate is that at some point the 
demand for investment goods slackens off, then we will see a reversal of this effect. ml+ would then 
become negative as prices start to fall relative to their labour values. This switch could moreover be 
quite sudden, because of the positive feedback from the demand for investment goods. 
But how can the demand for investment goods slacken off? Why, just because the average profit 
rate is in decline, should capitalists not continue to invest as long as there is at least some profit 
there for the taking? It is at this point that the importance of a temporal account of liquidity 
preference can be seen, for under a regime of falling ml+, a profit in value terms can be achieved by 
merely holding onto money.  
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